Sandworm Hackers Hit French Monitoring Software Vendor Centreon
The French National Agency for the Security of Information Systems (ANSSI) is publicly blaming the notorious Sandworm APT group for a series of long-term hacking attacks against multiple IT and web hosting shops in Europe.
According to a technical advisory released by ANSSI, the data breaches date back to 2017 and include the eyebrow-raising compromise of Centreon, an IT monitoring software provider widely embedded throughout government organizations in France.
The agency did not say if the Centreon compromise was part of a supply-chain attack but the decision to publicly identify the Sandworm attackers triggers new conversations about the group’s previous software supply chain targeting in high-profile APT attacks.
Documented research has linked the Sandworm team to a government-backed Russian APT group linked to separate attacks against Ukraine targets in 2015 and 2017, and the 2018 cyberattack on the Winter Olympics opening ceremony.
The French agency released a detailed technical report on the Centreon hack, which targeted Linux servers running the CentOS operating system. While the initial compromise method remains unknown, AANSI said the attackers deployed two backdoors and has “has many similarities to previous campaigns of the Sandworm modus operandi.”
The agency also found known Sandworm-controlled servers being used as part of the command-and-control infrastructure for the four-year-old infiltrations of French and European entities.
“Generally speaking, the intrusion set Sandworm is known to lead consequent intrusion campaigns before focusing on specific targets that fits its strategic interests within the victims pool. The campaign observed by ANSSI fits this behaviour,” the agency said.
The report details the use of public and commercial VPN services to communicate with the backdoors, listing several legitimate tools and providers within Sandworm’s arsenal.
AANSI also released a separate document with SNORT and YARA rules and other indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help threat hunters search for signs of Sandworm activity.
The agency also published a series of recommendations for organizations to raise the bar for Sandworm and other APT groups. These include improved patch management, server hardening, and limiting the exposure of monitoring systems.
“Monitoring systems such as Centreon need to be highly intertwined with the monitored information system and therefore are a prime target for intrusion sets seeking lateralisation,” the agency added.
“It is recommended either not to expose these tools’ web interfaces to the Internet or to restrict such access using non-applicative authentication (TLS client certificate, basic authentication on the web server).”